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RECENT DECISIONS

lOll

LABOR LAw-LMRA-DISCRIMINATION DISCHARGE-EFFECT OF LEGAL
GROUND FOR D1scHARGE WHERE PossrnLE DUAL MOTIVATION EXISTS-Respondent discharged an employee under the terms of a union contract
which provided that employees could be discharged for failure to carry
out the employer's orders. It was undisputed that the employee had failed
to submit required reports on at least two occasions. A complaint alleging
the commission of an unfair labor practice was filed. The National Labor
Relations Board1 found that the employee had been discharged as a
prisal for his union activities in violation of section 8 (a)(l) of the amended
National Labor Relations Act.2 The Board ordered reinstatement under
section IO (c) of the act. In an action by the Board seeking enforcement of

:re-

1 Huber and Huber Motor Express,
2 Labor-Management Relations Act,

109 N.L.R.B. 295 (1954).
1947, 61 Stat. L. 141, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (a){l)
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its order, held, enforcement denied. Where the Board could as reasonably
infer a proper collateral motive as an improper one, the act of the management cannot be set aside as being improperly motivated. NLRB v. Huber
and Huber Motor Express, (5th Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 748.
Section 10 (c) of the original NLRA, which empowered the NLRB to
order reinstatement in unfair labor practice cases,3 was qualified by a
clause in the amended NLRA which forbids reinstatement if the discharge
was "for cause."4 Since it is well established, even apart from the amendment, that discharge for cause does not provide grounds for reinstatement,!•
this provision creates problems of interpretation only when there have
been both discriminatory and proper grounds for discharge. Unfortunately,
the rationale of the decision i_n the principal case is not made clear by the
court and different interpretations are possible. If the court meant to
hold that where the evidence shows both proper and improper grounds
for discharge, the Board can no longer find as a matter of law that the employer has violated the act and accordingly order reinstatement, the holding
is inconsistent with a long line of both Board and court decisions.6 Such a
rationale would imply that where both proper and improper grounds for q.ischarge exist, the Board may not inquire into the actual motive of the employer for discharging the employee, but must find the discharge to be
proper. The Board's approach in cases where there is a possibility of dual
motivation has been to determine if in fact the employer was motivated at
least in part by anti-union animus. If such were the case, a violation was
found and reinstatement ordered.7 While this' approach appears sound, the
fact remains that the actual result in a number of cases indicates that union
affiliation on the part of the discharged employee seemed to insulate him
from discharge, even for the most serious misconduct. 8 Several court decisions under the original NLRA at least impliedly criticized the Board
for its over-zealous attitude in this respect and refused to enforce orders
of reinstatement on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify
a Generally under §8 (a) (1) or §8 (a) (3) of the amended NLRA.
4 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 147, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §160 (c).
Ii NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615 (1936); BallstonStillwater Knitting Co. v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 758; NLRB v. Citizen•
News Co., (9th Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 970.
6 NLRB v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., (8th Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 837;
Piedmont Shirt Co. v. NLRB, (4th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 739; Sorens Motor Co., 106
N.L.R.B. 652 (1953).
7 See NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 70 (1939); 7 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 797 (1939).
8 Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc., IO N.L.R.B. 1299 (1939). In a particularly
extreme decision, the Board found that an employee had been discriminatorily discharged
despite uncontradicted evidence to the effect that he was derelict in his duties, played
cards during 'lvorking hours and was incapable of properly carrying out his assigned task
which consisted of work in vital aircraft forgings. Wyman-Gordon Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 561
(1945). The reviewing court termed the decision "astounding" and refused to enforce
the Board's order of reinstatement Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1946) 153
F. (2d) 480.
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a finding of discriminatory discharge.9 Since the burden of proving discriminatory discharge rests on the General Counsel of the Board, who must
establish this fact by a preponderance of the evidence, 10 these decisions
rest fundamentally on the ground that he did not sustain his burden of
proof. This criticism of the Board's failure to maintain more exacting
standards with regard to the burden of proof imposed on the General
Counsel is reflected in a statement issued by the House Committee which
revised section 10 (c),U indicating that the primary purpose of the amended
provision was to remind the Board of its duty with regard to problems of
proof. This theory is supported by the fact that the amended section
10 (c) makes still further reference to evidentiary matters which do not
appear in the original section. A number of recent Board decisions, refusing to make a finding of discriminatory discharge, manifest in their
language a more acute awareness on the part of the Board of its duty to
establish a violation of the act by a preponderance of the evidence, rather
than by shadowy suspicions and inferences.12 This realization is enforced
by the provisions of section 10 (c) of the amended NLRA and by section
10 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act13 which now make the Board's
findings of fact conclusive on review only if supported by substantial
evidence on the whole record. The Supreme Court has held that these
provisions require reviewing courts to assume more responsibility for the
reasonableness and fairness of Board decisions.14 It may well be that the
theory of the court in the principal case, as in other recent cases,15 was
merely that where the Board can as reasonably infer a proper motive on
the part of the employer in taking a certain course of action as an unlawful
motive, substantial evidence has not proved the employer to be guilty of
an unfair labor practice. This seems likely since the same court recently
decided a case of alleged evasion of statutory obligation to bargain on an
identical rationale.16 The only other possible explanation for the decision
in the case is that the court interpreted the amended section 10 (c) to
provide that while the Board may still find a discriminatory discharge in
dual motivation cases, it may nevertheless not order reinstatement under
the qualifying clause of section 10 (c). A literal reading of the clause might
9 Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. NLRB, note 4 supra; Boeing Airplane Co. v.
NLRB, (10th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 423; NLRB v. Montgomery Ward and Co., (8th
Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 486.
10 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 147, 29 U.S.C. (1952) 160 (c).
11 H. Rep. 245, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 42 (1947): "A third change [in section 10 (c)]
forbids the Board to reinstate an individual unless the weight of the evidence shows that
the individual was not suspended or discharged for cause."
12 Western Textile Products Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 162 (1953); Milwaukee Nash Co., 105
N.L.R.B. 684 (1953); Radio Industries, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 912 (1952).
13 60 Stat. L. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1009 (e).
14 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456 (1951).
15 NLRB v. Arthur Winer, Inc., (7th Cir. 1952) 194 F., (2d) 370; NLRB v. Polynesian Arts, Inc., (6th Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 846; NLRB v. American Thread Co., (5th
Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 381.
16 NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., (5th Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 848.
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lend support to this view, but, since the very purpose of section IO (c) is
to empower the Board to prevent unfair labor practices, such an inter~
pretation would involve a particularly unlikely internal contradiction in
the terms of the act.
Joy Tannian, S. Ed.

